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Abstract 
For the London Stock Exchange, this paper investigates differences in trading costs between 
market maker (off-book) and order book trades, in the context of clustering in trade sizes and 
prices. We report several substantial findings. Even after controlling for differences in trade 
size, the realised spread measure is lower for off-book trades. For the order book, trade size 
clustering is not associated with differences in transaction costs nor with differences in the 
information content of trades. For the off-book market, trades in clustered (popular) sizes 
carry significantly more information than non-clustered trades. Despite the significant 
differences in the price impact estimates between the order book and off-book, we show that 
traders placing large orders off-book are still better off than trading via the order book as they 
benefit from a large discount from the current midpoint price. Additionally, we highlight that 
price and size clustering tend to occur simultaneously rather than being substitutes in this 
market setting. 
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1. Introduction 
The magnitude and significance of trade size clustering in financial markets has recently 
attracted attention (see Alexander and Peterson, 2007 and Moulton, 2005). Hodrick and 
Moulton (2009) demonstrate that liquidity has three dimensions; (1) price, (2) timing and (3) 
quantity. Therefore, investors need to focus not only on the price-time substitution effect, but 
also need to consider optimal traded quantities. That is, to the extent that investors fail to 
accommodate size in their optimal trade allocation decisions, their costs will increase. In 
particular, while previous studies focus on the extent of size clustering as well as the 
interaction of price clustering with size clustering, we extend this literature by examining the 
trade direction of size-clustered trades separately for liquidity demanders and liquidity 
providers. The latter allows us to study effective transaction costs and information flows 
separately for buy and sell orders and to establish to what extent the tendency of size 
clustering is linked to differences in market structure. 
This paper focuses on trading costs at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The unique 
structure of the LSE provides a further motivation for this study. In particular, although the 
main market at the LSE is a hybrid market, its market structure differs from the NYSE in 
relation to the interaction between market makers and order-book participants.1 At the LSE, 
the downstairs market (the order book) is independent of the upstairs (off-book) market 
(involving market-makers), which implies that the market makers have no obligation to offer 
quotes on the order book. In addition, there is limited interaction between the upstairs market 
and the order book. Trades in the LSE upstairs market are privately negotiated and as a result 
there are no minimum tick restrictions. The latter also implies that the time priority rule is not 
                                                          
1 At the NYSE, dealers are obliged to trade on the order book and are generally considered an integral part of 
the order book. 
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relevant, as upstairs market participants are able to front-run other investors by applying a 
very small incremental price improvement (see also Harris, 1991). 
The upstairs market facilitates large trade sizes, as these trades would cause an adverse price 
effect in the order-book (see Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004).2 When controlling for 
trade size differences, the information content of trades is greater for trades executed on the 
downstairs element of the London Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS) than for trades 
executed on the upstairs market (see Jain et al., 2010). 3  The latter finding is also confirmed 
by Gajewski and Gresse (2007) for the order books of Euronext Paris and the LSE, 
suggesting that informed trades are routed to the downstairs market. Further, Gajewski and 
Gresse (2007) show that small and medium-sized trades pay lower execution costs on the 
LSE order book than do same-size trades conducted in the upstairs market.  We extend this 
literature in several respects. First, we provide evidence on trade execution costs net of the 
price impact component of trades, separately for the downstairs and the upstairs markets of 
the LSE. Related to this, we study execution costs separately for liquidity demanders and 
liquidity providers. Second, we examine execution cost differences on the LSE in light of the 
findings of Alexander and Peterson (2007) and Moulton (2005) that there are significant 
differences in execution and price impact costs between trades in popular sizes and those in 
non-clustered sizes. Hence, our primary aim is to study differences in transaction costs across 
different market structures with regard to their relationship to trade size clustering. 
                                                          
2 Transparency is important in upstairs markets. Bernhardt et al. (2004) show that market participants that trade 
outside the order book tend to receive substantial discounts (price improvements) for larger trades when trading 
with a smaller number of dealers. 
3 SETS is the main electronic order book market in the LSE and the main trading platform for the most liquid 
securities. 
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Overall, we investigate three main hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that in a setting like 
SETS at the LSE, in which the minimum tick size is applied to the order book but not for the 
upstairs market, market participants in the latter market anchor their prices to the established 
minimum tick size applied on the order book. Second, we investigate the hypothesis that 
clustered trades (i.e. popular sizes) are associated with higher price impact than non-clustered 
trades. Third, we test the hypothesis that price clustering and size clustering are determined 
endogenously. A significant part of the contribution lies in the fact that we study the above 
hypotheses separately for liquidity providers and liquidity demanders 
We use the effective half spread and its components as a measure of trading costs. We show 
that even after controlling for differences in trade size, the realised spread measure (which is 
net of the adverse selection costs) is lower for the off-book trades. Most importantly however, 
we investigate the level of trading costs and the informational content of trades that are 
associated with the optimal price/optimal size trading decisions. We do so in a setting that 
allows us to study market maker trades separately from non-exchange member trades. We 
document extensive size clustering in both markets, which persists when controlling for trade 
sizes. For the downstairs market, while the majority of assets trade in multiples of 500 shares, 
trade size clustering is not associated with differences in transaction costs nor with 
differences in the information content of trades. For the upstairs market, trades in the 
clustered (popular) sizes carry significantly more information than non-clustered trades. We 
also show that traders placing large orders via the upstairs market are still better off than 
trading via the order book. The latter finding holds mainly for buy orders and the benefits 
derived from trading in the upstairs market are greater for larger trade sizes. 
In a second layer of analysis, we use a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) model to study whether 
price clustering and size clustering are substitutes or complements. We show that pricing in 
the upstairs market follows the notional minimum tick size rules (these are only binding for 
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the downstairs market), hence, prices cluster in multiples of the minimum tick size. The 
intraday distributions of price and size clustering exhibit a high correlation coefficient and 
this finding is validated with a multivariate model. We show that when trading frequency 
increases, market participants trade at clustered prices and clustered sizes, which supports the 
hypothesis that in busy trading periods, maximising liquidity comes at the expense of 
maximising utility from trading at exact prices and trade sizes. The latter is also confirmed at 
the end-of-quarter periods and is in contrast with the findings of Moulton (2005).  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on size 
and price clustering. Section 3 outlines the data and Section 4 discusses the methodology.  
Section 5 presents the results and discusses the findings, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and positioning of the paper 
In an ideal world, an investor is able to trade at the exact desired price, the exact desired size 
and at an exact time (see Harris, 2003, p. 398). Theoretically, Hodrick and Moulton (2009) 
demonstrate that deviations from the optimum trade price and optimum trade size impose 
shadow costs on portfolio managers. Moulton (2005) further argues that investors who are 
not able to optimize all three dimensions of liquidity need to consider the trade-offs regarding 
substituting the optimum price with the optimum size. To date, the literature is mainly 
concerned with deviations from the optimum price and offers little evidence on the costs 
faced by investors when there exist trade-offs in substituting optimum prices with optimum 
sizes.   
Previous studies on price clustering have mainly focused on the motivation of market 
participants to concentrate their terms of trading in specific prices. Four theories have been 
widely cited as potential explanations for the clustering of final digits. Firstly, the negotiation 
theory (Harris, 1991) states that investors tend to reduce their terms of trading when there is 
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an increased need to execute trades. The negotiation hypothesis implies that price clustering 
will increase in periods of abnormally heavy trading. Secondly, the price resolution 
hypothesis (Ball et al., 1985) proposes that there is a difference between the “true” price of 
the asset and its observable price which is determined by the amount of information about 
that asset, its price level and variability. As a result, the greater the level of information, the 
larger the available price set should be. Thirdly, Goodhart and Curcio (1991) trace 
behavioural elements in price clustering, which might reflect a general tendency to use round 
numbers. Fourthly, Christie and Schultz (1994) and Christie, Harris and Schultz (1994) 
attribute price clustering at NASDAQ to the anticompetitive behaviour of dealers who 
implicitly colluded to increase market making revenues. Numerous empirical studies 
document price clustering in the equity, derivatives and foreign exchange markets (see Ahn et 
al., 2005, ap Gwilym and Verousis, 2010, Chung and Chiang, 2006, Narayan et al., 2011 and 
Sopranzetti and Datar, 2002).  
A second stream of literature is generally consistent with the view that trade prices and trade 
sizes are determined simultaneously. Moulton (2005) shows that investors demonstrate an 
increased need to trade in exact quantities at year ends. Also, when investors choose to trade 
at exact quantities, the price impact of trades is greater, which reflects an increased need to 
trade at exact quantities rather than an increase in the available size set.  The price-size 
substitution effect documented by Moulton (2005) for the foreign exchange market is not 
supported by the findings of Alexander and Peterson (2007) for stocks trading at the NYSE 
and NASDAQ markets. These authors show that price and size clustering are supplements 
hence occur simultaneously, which is consistent with the negotiation hypothesis of price 
clustering (Harris, 1991). The latter hypothesis is partially examined in ap Gwilym and Meng 
(2010), who report that size clustering in the FTSE100 futures market is inversely related to 
transaction frequency and is influenced by similar determinants to these identified in the price 
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clustering literature. Finally, Blau et al. (2012) show that short sellers’ single aim is to exploit 
information inefficiencies, hence they are less concerned with the indirect negotiation and 
adverse price movement costs. The authors report that short selling positions demonstrate less 
size clustering and price clustering than non-short selling trades, which confirms the 
hypothesis that short sellers are more focused on private information than negotiation costs.  
In light of this literature, we study three main themes. The first theme investigates to what 
extent differences in market structure affect price and size clustering.  Previous literature has 
documented price clustering on the order book (see Ahn et al., 2005) and on a dealer market 
(see Christie and Schultz, 1994). However, the market structure of the LSE allows us to 
compare clustering of prices and sizes at downstairs and upstairs markets for the same assets. 
We hypothesize that in a setting like the main trading platform of the LSE, in which the 
minimum tick size is applied to the order book (SETS) but not for the upstairs market, market 
participants in the latter market anchor their prices to the established minimum tick size 
applied on the order book. Our second theme relates to the findings of Alexander and 
Peterson (2007) and Moulton (2005) regarding differences in the effective cost and price 
impact of clustered trades (i.e. in popular sizes) versus non-clustered trades. We investigate 
differences in trading costs within the different LSE market structures in relation to 
differences in trade size clustering. As in Alexander and Peterson (2007) and Moulton 
(2005), we hypothesize that clustered trades are associated with higher price impact than non-
clustered trades.  
The third theme is related to the trade-off between size and price clustering. We hypothesize 
that price clustering and size clustering are determined endogenously which will confirm 
previous findings relating to the dimensions of liquidity (see Hodrick and Moulton, 2009). 
The negotiation theory implies that if investors want to reduce execution costs, both price and 
size clustering will increase simultaneously. Also, price and size clustering will increase in 
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periods of high trading intensity. In contrast, Moulton (2005) shows that size clustering 
decreases at quarter ends. In a second level of analysis, we are able to test the above 
hypotheses, and an important part of the contribution lies in doing this separately for liquidity 
providers and liquidity demanders.  
3. Market structure and data 
The data are obtained from the LSE historical data service and include all trades and quotes 
reported on the exchange in 2005. The microstructure of the main trading platform of the 
LSE comprises of SETS (a central order book) and the upstairs market (a network of market 
makers who provide dealer services on a voluntary basis and have no interaction with the 
order book). Under the LSE rules, the choice of trading venue rests entirely with the buy-side 
of the market (see Friederich and Payne, 2007). Thus, customers wishing to trade on SETS 
can choose whether to post a limit or market order on the order book or execute their order 
against the market makers’ inventory in the upstairs market. The order book is fully 
transparent as customers are able to observe its full depth, nevertheless trades are anonymous. 
Trades executed off-book are privately negotiated, hence quotes are provided on a bilateral 
basis only and there is no minimum price increment. The microstructure of the LSE is 
different from the trading arrangements of the NYSE in which market makers are generally 
considered a part of the order book. On the NYSE, trades negotiated off-book are exposed on 
the order book, while market makers’ prices are constrained by the order book.  
We identify downstairs (order-book) and upstairs (market maker) trades. The minimum price 
increment is a function of price level and varies across different market segments. All 
cancelled, zero-volume, zero-price, out-of-hours and out-of-date trades are removed. In order 
to detect outliers, we delete all trades that report either a price change of greater than 25% or 
a price which differs from the present midquote by more than 25% (Bessembinder, 1997). In 
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order to avoid stale pricing and missing data problems, we select firms that report at least one 
trade per hour for the sample period, separately for the upstairs and the downstairs markets. 
We focus on the minimum tick sizes of xx.25p and xx.50p. The resulting sample of 36 assets 
consists of firms trading on the main Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service (SET1 and 
SET2). 4 
4. Methods 
4.1. The magnitude of size and price clustering 
In order to identify the extent of size clustering, we regress the percentage of trades 
conducted in size i against size dummy variables for the most popular sizes. We calculate the 
percentage of orders traded at lots of 100 shares as equal-weighted averages across all stocks 
in the sample and then regress the percentage of orders traded at each lot against certain size 
multiples (see Alexander and Peterson, 2007): 
 
                            (1) 
 
LnSizePerv is the percentage of orders traded at size v, separately for the upstairs and the 
downstairs markets. D500,v, D1000,v and D5000,v  are dummy variables that equal 1 if the trade 
size v is a multiple of 500, 1000 and 5000 shares respectively. LnSizev is the natural logarithm 
of trade size v.  
                                                          
4 LSE opens at 8:00 and closes at 16:30. We form 8 hourly intervals (hours starting 8:00 – 15:00). The 
remaining interval is 30 minutes. 250 trading days are identified.  In total, 41 assets met the selection criterion, 
but 5 assets were dropped from the sample as they were the only assets traded with a minimum tick of one 
pound.  
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Since trades conducted at the upstairs market do not have to adhere to the minimum tick size 
restrictions, we test the significance of price clustering in the upstairs market as follows: 
 
          (2) 
 
LnPricePerz is the percentage of orders traded at a decimal price z on the upstairs market. 
D0,z, D0.25,z, D0.50,z and D0.75,z are dummy variables that equal 1 if the decimal in the traded 
price z is 0, 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 respectively. LnPricez is the natural logarithm of price z.  
For the classification of sell and buy orders, we employ the tick trade identification algorithm 
(see Finucane, 2000).5 Trades that are conducted above the previous traded price are 
classified as buys, while trades that are conducted below are classified as sells (both taking 
the investor perspective). For the upstairs market, LSE Rule 3012.2 instructs market makers 
to report trades when dealing with investors (i.e. non exchange members). Hence, for the 
upstairs market, assuming that investors are always the trade initiators (see Friederich and 
Payne, 2007), trades that are classified as buys (under the above method) are effectively buy 
orders from the perspective of the liquidity provider (the market makers) and sell orders from 
the perspective of the liquidity demander (non-market maker participants). In order to study 
trades from the perspective of the liquidity demander, we reverse the trade sign for the 
upstairs market.6 For the downstairs market, the trade is classified from the perspective of the 
trade initiator i.e. the liquidity demander.  
                                                          
5 In contrast to microstructure studies on the LSE using data from an earlier time period (see Jain et al., 2010), 
the trade sign is not provided by the exchange in datasets for more recent years. 
6 Often, in trades conducted between two market makers, it is the seller who reports the trade. However, market 
maker-to-market maker trades, which account for less than 1% of the total sample, are deleted from the sample, 
hence this potential problem does not apply to the current study.  
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Alexander and Peterson (2007) report that size clustering increases with trade size. In order to 
control for these differences, we test for size clustering across trade sizes, using binomial z-
tests for the equality of proportions below and above multiples of 500 shares. For example, 
for trades of 500 shares, we select trades conducted at 400 and 600 shares and test for the 
equality of proportions. Alexander and Peterson (2007) iterate this method up to 20,000 
shares. However, we restrict our calculations to up to 10,000 shares, as this captures more 
than 83% of the sample and guarantees increased trading frequency around trade multiples. 
4.2. Size clustering and trading costs 
We calculate the effective half-spread (EHS) as a consistent transaction cost measure that 
also accounts for trading inside the quotes (Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997):7 
 
                                                                   (3) 
 
EHSi,tick is the effective half-spread measure per asset i, calculated for all trades at irregular 
time intervals. Di,tick equals one for buy orders and negative one for sell orders. Pi,tick is the 
trade price and Mi,tick is the prevailing midpoint at the time of the trade.  For the downstairs 
trades, the EHS is calculated based on the most recent quotes. However, for the upstairs 
market, as LSE rules allow market makers to report trades within three minutes of their 
execution, we calculate the EHS by selecting the most recent quotes that have been posted at 
least three minutes before the trade and not more than sixty minutes prior to the trade.  
                                                          
7 The EHS is always positive for buys (sells) conducted above (below) the midprice. However, for the upstairs 
market, we expect the EHS to be negative as the trade sign is reversed. In the latter cases, the more negative the 
EHS, the smaller the implied cost of trade. 
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In order to control for trade size differences, we calculate test statistics for the equality of 
means using trade-size levels. Bessembinder (1997) notes that the EHS may give 
inconclusive results in a situation where market makers widen spreads in reaction to trades 
which potentially contain private information. In order to assess this possibility, we 
decompose the EHS into its informative component and the market cost component. We 
measure price impact (PI), the component of the spread that accounts for superior 
information, as follows:8 
 
 .                                                                 (4) 
 
Similar to Alexander and Peterson (2007), we measure PI as the difference in quote 
midpoints between the current trade and first trade reported at least 5 minutes after the 
announcement of the trade. As with the calculation of the EHS, for upstairs trades Mi,tick 
denotes the midpoint that has been posted at least three minutes before the trade and not more 
than sixty minutes prior to the trade. Finally, the realised spread (RHS) component is 
measured as follows:9 
 
                                                                                            (5) 
                                                          
8 Irrespective of considering the liquidity demander or supplier, PI reflects the opportunity cost for conducting a 
trade, hence the more positive the PI the greater the informational content of the trade and the greater the benefit 
from conducting the trade. 
9 The more negative the RHS, the greater the benefit derived for the investor, irrespective of the trade 
classification, as it implies that either the EHS is smaller than the PI or that the EHS is more negative than the 
negative PI. 
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The RHS measure is thus a more appropriate measure of market making revenues as it is net 
of losses to informed traders (see Bessembinder, 1997). EHS, PI and RHS estimates are 
subsequently aggregated to equal-weighted averages for each day, t. 
4.3. Size and price clustering: supplements or substitutes? 
We estimate a 2SLS model to test the hypothesis that when investors are faced with the 
problem of optimising the price and size of their trades, they do so simultaneously. In order to 
investigate the outcome for the above hypothesis in the upstairs and the downstairs market, 
we estimate separate regressions for each market structure. The fact that market makers are 
not obliged to adhere to the minimum tick restrictions necessitates the use of different 
definitions of price clustering for these markets. We define price clustering on the order-book 
as the occurrence of trades in integers, while in the upstairs market, prices are defined as 
clustered when reported at multiples of the minimum tick size. We use the following 2SLS 
model:  
 
 .              (6) 
 
                           (7) 
 
SzClst is the percentage of trades conducted at multiples of 500 shares and PrClst is the 
percentage of trades conducted at integers (downstairs market) or at multiples of the 
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minimum tick size (upstairs market). Frq is the daily number of trades for each asset, 
separately for each market structure. Moulton (2005) argues that the total number of trades 
per interval reflects increased liquidity needs, thus we expect a positive sign on Frq. 
SQRTFrq is the inverse square root of the daily number of trades. Harris (1991) shows that 
transaction frequency is positively related to price clustering, hence, the expected sign for 
SQRTFrq is negative.10 AR is the average absolute daily return calculated over hourly 
intervals. In order to control for possible overnight return jumps, we exclude the open return.  
In several studies, price clustering is found to increase during high volatility periods (see Ahn 
et al., 2005 and ap Gwilym et al., 1998). Also, Moulton (2005) and ap Gwilym and Meng 
(2010) show that volatility is also a positive determinant for size clustering.  
LnTrdSz denotes the natural logarithm of the average daily trade size for each asset 
(separately for order-book and market maker trades). Price clustering has been found to be 
positively correlated with trade size (Harris, 1991), implying that since the economic impact 
of the minimum tick size is greater for small trades, investors will use a coarser set of prices 
for large trades. OEQ is a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a stock trade 
occurs within the last two weeks of a calendar quarter end. Moulton (2005) shows that size 
clustering decreases at quarter-end periods which reflects the internal monitoring of trading 
firms. LnMV is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation for each firm.11 Price clustering 
is expected to decrease with firm size (Harris, 1991). PrcLvl denotes the average daily price 
level for each asset and market segment. Ahn et al (2005) suggest that PrcLvl is positively 
related to price clustering and Harris (1991) suggests that a positive sign is expected because 
minimum tick size rules are more restrictive for lower-priced stocks. Finally, Tck is a control 
variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks with a minimum tick of xx.50p and 0 for stocks 
trading at xx.25p. 
                                                          
10 In Moulton (2005), this variable is not significant for FX transactions. 
11 Data on firm values are obtained from DataStream. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. As expected, assets with the smaller tick size trade 
at relatively lower prices, with small differences in average price between the upstairs and 
downstairs markets. The role of the upstairs market as a facilitator of block trades becomes 
apparent when looking at the size columns across both tick sizes. For the smaller tick size 
(.25p), mean daily trade size significantly differs from 11,770.95 for order-book trades to 
43,518.56 for off-book trades. For the .50p tick size, average price levels are at 
approximately 760p compared to 280p for the smaller tick, whereas the equal-weighted 
average daily trade size is 3,739.36 for order-book and 21,232.23 for off-book trades. The 
distribution of trades at each price category shows that more than one-fifth of off-book trades 
are conducted at the implicit minimum tick. Finally, Harris (1991) documents that price 
clustering increases with an increasing price level and in Table 1 we show that the mean price 
varies with the final integer. In particular, both mean price and size measures increase at 
whole digits, thus reflecting the use of a smaller set of decimal prices for higher priced assets 
and larger size trades.  
 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
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5.2. Results for the magnitude of size and price clustering 
5.2.1. The distribution of trade size and trade price 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of trade size for order-book (Panel A) and market maker 
trades (Panel B).12 Size frequency is a decreasing function of trade size and tends to be less 
concentrated for the downstairs market. Three distinctive sizes emerge: multiples of 500, 
1000 and 5000 shares. Trades of 1000 shares are the most popular size. The size distributions 
for the downstairs and upstairs markets are investigated using Equation 1 and the results are 
presented in Table 2.  
 
***Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
 
Table 2 (Panel A) verifies the findings of Figure 1 that trade sizes are clustered at multiples 
of 500, 1000 and 5000 shares. Also, the coefficient estimates for order-book and market 
maker trades are very similar and show strong clustering at multiples of 500 shares. Hence, 
for the remainder of the paper we define size clustering on the basis of multiples of 500 
shares which enables investigation of the association between size clustering and price 
clustering. 
Table 2 (Panel B) also presents the results for the price clustering distribution for market 
maker trades (Equation 2).13 Recall that the upstairs market at the LSE has no minimum tick 
size rule. As hypothesized, there is a strong clustering of traded prices at the notional ticks of 
                                                          
12 We present the distribution of trade size only up to 10,000 shares in order to conserve space. 
13 For the downstairs market, prices can only take up to four decimal values. 
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.25p, .50p, .75p and integers. The coefficients for the price multiples are all highly significant 
and price clustering increases for higher price levels. 
 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
5.2.2. The impact of trade size on size clustering 
Table 3 controls for the inverse relation between size and size frequency identified in Table 2. 
We focus on the distribution of size clustering around multiples of 500 shares. We test for the 
equality of differences between multiples of 500 shares and their close round equivalents (for 
example 900 and 1100 against 1000 shares).14 Table 3 shows that even when controlling for 
differences in trade size, size clustering is highly statistically significant.  
 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
 
In testing for size clustering differences between the downstairs and upstairs markets, we 
confirm that there is a significant difference in the distributions of sizes across these markets, 
which holds for both buy and sell orders. The latter is of particular importance, as buy and 
sell off-book trades reflect the direct negotiation of trades with market makers in the upstairs 
market. Despite controlling for trade size, we find that trading in the upstairs market is 
concentrated in a smaller set of sizes. 
                                                          
14 That is, we employ the z-score in order to test the null that the relative frequency of clustered sizes is less than 
or equal to 1/3 of the overall trading frequency around multiples of clustered trades (e.g. around multiples of 
500 shares, see also Alexander and Peterson, 2007). We conduct individual tests for each multiple of 500 shares 
and its counterparts and for each asset. The results are then aggregated to determine a z-score for each asset and 
a z-score for all assets. 
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5.3. Results for size clustering and trading costs 
5.3.1. Effective half spread 
This section studies the hypothesis that clustered trades (those in popular sizes) are associated 
with greater price impact than non-clustered trades. Table 4 presents trading costs for a single 
trip trade, computed separately for clustered sizes (multiples of 500, denoted SzClst) and non-
clustered sizes (Sz) for the downstairs and upstairs markets. We also present the results 
separately for buy and sell orders to capture overall trade costs in both market structures.  
 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
 
For the downstairs market, the EHS estimates for each asset show that most assets 
demonstrate a significant difference in the transaction cost estimates between clustered and 
non-clustered trades. Nevertheless, no clear pattern emerges and the difference becomes 
insignificant at the aggregate level. Overall, the EHS is similar for clustered and non-
clustered trades for both buys and sells. For the downstairs market, on a per asset basis, buy 
(sell) orders tend to be filled below (above) the current midprice, resulting in smaller 
execution costs for assets trading off-book.15 
For the upstairs market buy orders, 16 of 36 assets exhibit a statistically significant difference 
in EHS between clustered and non-clustered trades. In aggregate however, there is no 
statistically significant difference between clustered and non-clustered buy trades. For the sell 
orders however, a clear pattern emerges whereby 32 assets exhibit lower transaction costs for 
                                                          
15 As both markets are investigated from the perspective of the liquidity demander, the results are comparable 
across market structures.  
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clustered trades than non-clustered trades. In total, a statistically significant difference of 3.7 
basis points exists between sell orders in popular and non-popular sizes.   
5.3.2. Price impact 
We further investigate the above findings by decomposing the spread into its components, PI 
and RHS. Table 5 presents PI estimates that account for the price reaction to trading activity 
and reflect adverse selection costs. For the downstairs market, on the buy (sell) side, 19 (23) 
assets exhibit a positive and statistically significant difference for PI between clustered trades 
and non-clustered trades. This is consistent with the findings of Alexander and Peterson 
(2007) that trades in popular sizes tend to convey more information than unrounded trades. 
Overall however, the results for the downstairs market show that sell orders have a significant 
PI difference between clustered and non-clustered trades at the 10% level. For the upstairs 
market, the PI of non-clustered trades is often negative and overall clustered trades also 
exhibit greater information content than non-clustered trades. This difference is a statistically 
significant 2.7 basis points for buy orders. 
 
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
5.3.3. Realized half-spread 
Table 6 presents the results for the RHS component of the EHS. For the downstairs market, 
even though the (overall) results are significant at the 10% level for sell orders, no clear 
pattern emerges. For the upstairs market, differences in the RHS between clustered and non-
clustered trades are significant for 68 of 72 cases. This is an expected outcome because (as 
demonstrated above) trading off-book is advantageous in terms of trading further away from 
the current midprice and also in terms of off-book trades exhibiting larger price impact. 
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Regarding the effect of size clustering, clustered trades demonstrate lower RHS and buy (sell) 
orders show that on average a statistically significant difference of 3.5 (4.5) basis points 
exists.  
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
5.3.4. Summary of results for size clustering and trading costs 
Tables 4-6 show that, for the downstairs market, several significant differences exist between 
clustered (popular sizes) and non-clustered buy and sell orders. In aggregate, the significance 
either generally disappears or is not strong enough to imply a systematic pattern. It is worth 
noting that orders in popular sizes carry more information than non-clustered orders (albeit at 
the 10% significance level).  
For the upstairs market however, an interesting and clear pattern emerges. We show that 
traders submitting orders off-book generally receive better execution costs than in the order-
book market. Clustered trades executed in the upstairs market exhibit, in aggregate, lower 
costs than non-clustered trades. However, the results for buyer-initiated trades are not 
statistically significant. 
 Decomposing the spread demonstrates that clustered buy orders exhibit a statistically 
significant difference in their PI estimates of 2.7%. For the sell orders, while the positive 
difference in the PI remains, the results are not significant. This finding is important as it 
shows that while buy orders in popular sizes are not associated with greater execution costs, 
they tend to carry greater information content. On the other hand, when investors are on the 
sell side, trades in popular sizes resemble liquidity orders (or orders with limited speculative 
nature) as they are generally not associated with a statistically significant price impact. 
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Finally, the RHS estimates show that investors are better off trading upstairs because the 
combination of low execution costs with a larger price impact results in negative RHS 
estimates. Net transaction costs are significantly higher for non-clustered trades than 
clustered trades, a finding that holds for both buy and sell orders. When combining the results 
of the PI with the RHS estimates, we show that when investors trade at multiples of 500 
shares, these trades tend to reveal more information, confirming our hypothesis. However, 
investors are better off trading at the upstairs market because they receive better execution 
costs even after controlling for the price impact. 
5.3.5. The effect of trade size on trading cost estimates 
Table 7 considers the effect that trade size variability may have on the cost and price impact 
findings. We report the aggregate results in three different trade size categories: 1 to 1500 
shares, 1501 to 3000 and 3001 or more shares.16 With regard to the downstairs market, one 
important finding is that spread and price impact measures are relatively constant across all 
trade size categories.17 Also, as expected, there is no statistically significant difference 
between clustered and non-clustered trades for buy or sell orders in any size category.  
 
***Insert Table 7 about here*** 
 
                                                          
16 50% of downstairs (upstairs) trades are below 1000 (2450) shares and two-thirds of downstairs (upstairs) 
trades are below 3000 (6700) shares. We arbitrarily use the categories above that capture the trade size effect 
and also, at least partially, offer a comparison of sizes between the downstairs and upstairs markets. We present 
the aggregate results only in order to conserve space. 
17 Overall however, PI increases with increasing trade size levels (see also Jiang et al., 2009 for NYSE and 
NASDAQ stocks) 
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For the upstairs market buy trades for trade sizes up to 1500 shares, the spread and price 
impact estimates remain at similar levels for buy and sell orders. Nevertheless, for larger 
trades, both components of the EHS increase substantially.  For trades up to 3000 shares, 
there is no statistically significant difference for RHS between clustered and non-clustered 
trades. For orders over 3000 shares, clustered trades exhibit smaller RHS than non-clustered 
trades, a finding that is supported by a high PI component for the clustered trades. For sell 
orders, the RHS is significantly smaller for clustered trades than non-clustered trades for each 
trade size category, and as with buy orders, it becomes relatively large for the larger trade 
sizes. Nevertheless, the PI component of the spread remains statistically similar between sell 
orders conducted in popular and less-popular sizes.  It follows that the decision to sell at 
popular sizes is not associated with differences in the information content of trades.  
 
5.4. Results for size and price clustering: supplements or substitutes? 
5.4.1. Two-stage least squares 
For the third and final theme, we investigate the hypothesis that a substitution effect may 
exist between price and size clustering. An indication of the relationship between price and 
size clustering is offered in Figure 2. It is clear that both the upstairs and downstairs markets 
indicate a strong correlation between price and size clustering. The correlation coefficient 
(for intraday intervals) between size clustering and integer price clustering is 0.90 for the 
downstairs market and 0.82 for the upstairs market. 
 
***Insert Figure 2 about here*** 
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Table 8 presents the results of the Hausman test for endogeneity between price and size 
clustering using Equations 6 and 7. Results for both markets are highly significant; hence, a 
2SLS model is implemented to account for the endogeneity between price and size 
clustering.18  
 
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
 
Table 9 presents the 2SLS regression estimates. The results for both markets show that 
trading at exact prices has a positive association with trading at exact sizes. This is consistent 
with the findings of Alexander and Peterson (2007). In the upstairs market, in which 
negotiations are more direct, it is clear that a simultaneous (or complementary) effect 
between price and size clustering exists, hence the positive signs for both price and size 
clustering variables. However, for the downstairs market, it is shown that when investors 
increase trading at exact sizes they tend to use a wider set of prices which compensates the 
loss of optimality.  
 
***Insert Table 9 about here*** 
 
The results from the frequency variables are consistent with the previous literature, though 
only significant for the downstairs trades. The latter is inconsistent with the negotiation 
theory in price clustering (Harris, 1991) and the information-arrival hypothesis in size 
clustering (ap Gwilym and Meng, 2010). However, as ap Gwilym et al. (1998) and Alexander 
and Peterson (2007) indicate, trading in busy periods leads to the use of a smaller trade size 
                                                          
18 For reasons of brevity we only present the relevant coefficients.  
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and trade price set.  There is no such relationship for the upstairs market, which may provide 
an indication of its more fragmented nature.  
5.4.2. Other determinants of size and price clustering 
Table 9 also documents the determinants of size and price clustering outside the price, size 
and time dimensions discussed by Hodrick and Moulton (2009). In particular, we show that 
several strong similarities exist between the upstairs and the downstairs market with regard to 
the decision to trade at exact sizes.  Size clustering increases with the volatility of returns and 
with trade size, and decreases with market value. The results for the end-of-quarter dummy 
are also positive and marginally significant which is in contrast to the findings of Moulton 
(2005). This supports the hypothesis that investors at the end-of-quarter trading periods 
choose to focus on liquidity at the expense of exact trade prices and trade sizes. These results 
support the negotiation hypothesis for size and price clustering. 
The results on price clustering determinants show that price clustering increases during 
volatile periods in the downstairs market but not in the upstairs market.  For the downstairs 
market, we verify that price clustering increases with the trade size and decreases for higher 
valued firms, as the negotiation theory implies. For the upstairs market, we show that larger 
trades are more accurately priced. The results on the price level are consistent with the 
previous literature and are similar for both market structures (see also Ahn et al., 2005). 
Finally, we show that trading at integers is more prevalent for the larger tick size at the 
downstairs market, while the opposite is true for the upstairs market. The latter result 
indicates that participants deviate from trading at the implicit minimum tick when it becomes 
too costly to trade i.e. when it is relatively large. 
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6. Conclusions 
Hodrick and Moulton (2009) show that if portfolio managers concentrate on the price-time 
substitution effect and omit the effects of trade size, they will impose additional costs on their 
portfolio allocation strategies. Despite the importance of the trade size (quantity) dimension, 
it is only recently that studies have begun to explore the full extent of the size-price 
relationship in financial markets. Alexander and Peterson (2007) show that price and size 
clustering occur simultaneously, which is consistent with the trade size negotiation cost 
hypothesis, similar to the price clustering negotiation hypothesis (Harris, 1991).  
This paper explores size and price clustering in the upstairs (market maker) and downstairs 
(order book) markets of the LSE. This exchange offers an optimal setting for capturing the 
trading arrangements of market makers, given that the upstairs market operates independently 
from the downstairs market and market makers have no obligation to facilitate trading on the 
order book. Using a trade identification algorithm, we are able to document the size and price 
clustering patterns on the buy and sell sides. 
We show that there is extensive size clustering in both the downstairs and upstairs markets of 
the LSE, which is expressed in multiples of 500 shares and shows strong resemblance to trade 
price clustering. We show that even after controlling for the trade size effect, the realised 
spread measure, which is net of adverse selection costs, is lower for off-book trades. We also 
document a significant difference in realized costs between trades in clustered (popular) and 
non-clustered sizes in both the upstairs and downstairs markets. For the downstairs market, 
while the majority of assets are trading in multiples of 500 shares, trade size clustering is not 
associated with differences in realized costs nor with differences in the information content of 
trades. For the upstairs market, trades in popular sizes carry significantly more information 
than trades in non-clustered sizes. However, we show that traders executing large orders via 
the upstairs market are still better off than trading via the order book. The latter finding holds 
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mainly for buy orders and the benefits derived from trading in the upstairs market increase 
for larger trade sizes. 
Finally, we study the interaction of price clustering and trade size clustering and identify their 
determinants for each market structure. We confirm the hypothesis that trade size and trade 
price are determined endogenously. In particular, we report that in the upstairs market, price 
and size clustering complement each other rather than being substitutes, after controlling for 
transaction frequency. For the downstairs market, trade size clustering is also a positive 
function of the time and price dimensions of liquidity but price clustering follows a different 
pattern. At the quarter-end periods, market participants choose to focus on liquidity at the 
expense of exact trade sizes, which contrasts with Moulton (2005). For the downstairs 
market, the decision to trade at exact quantities and/or exact prices is largely in line with the 
negotiation hypothesis (Harris, 1991). For the upstairs market, the latter implication only 
holds for the decision to trade at exact trade sizes. 
Our analysis of the upstairs and downstairs markets strongly confirms previous findings 
(Moulton, 2005) that liquidity entails three dimensions: namely, price, size and time. Most 
importantly, our evidence suggests that trade size clustering is strongly associated with the 
price impact measures. Market participants that fail to account for the information content of 
trades at multiples of 500 units are exposed to high adverse selection costs.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Assets with minimum tick xx.25 Assets with minimum tick xx.50 
Market Downstairs Upstairs Downstairs Upstairs 
 
Price Size Price Size Price Size Price Size 
Panel A: Integers 
Perc. 30.9 6.4 56.7 12.2 
Mean 282.9 13475.5 282.5 165207.8 765.9 4070.3 765.9 61045.6 
SD 23.3 25947.7 41.9 1030609.7 47.4 6693.6 111.2 547139.0 
Panel B: xx.50  
Perc. 27.4 5.3 43.3 9.2 
Mean 282.9 12110.7 282.2 121038.1 744.0 3499.6 751.2 40057.9 
SD 23.2 22845.2 23.1 921929.7 36.9 5686.8 45.7 353255.7 
Panel C: xx.25 
Perc. 20.4 4.2 . 2.0 
Mean 277.1 11099.4 278.9 81768.0 . . 758.7 25698.6 
SD 21.2 20958.0 22.4 404655.6 . . 47.4 184315.6 
Panel D: xx.75  
Perc. 21.28 4.2 . 1.77 
Mean 277.1 10998.1 278.4 88910.5 . . 757.0 68247.3 
SD 21.3 20846.6 22.4 506031.7 . . 48.8 1522364.3 
Panel E: Totals  
Days 250 250 250 250 
Perc. 82.3 17.7 85.0 15.0 
Price/Size 280.6 11770.9 280.6 43518.6 760.3 3739.4 760.4 21232.2 
Buy (Sell) 51.2 (48.8) 48.1 (51.9) 51.2 (48.8) 48.8 (51.2) 
Perc. denotes the proportion of trades at each price category. For the downstairs market, Perc across Panels A-D add up to 100%. For the upstairs market, the sum of Perc 
across Panels A-D is always less than 100 and the difference denotes the percentage that trades in other end-digits. Mean and SD denote the average mean price / trade size 
and standard deviation estimates per asset for each sub-sample respectively, estimated as an equal-weighted average at each sub-sample. Price and size denote the equal-
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weighted average price and traded size for  each sub-sample respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Size and price clustering regression estimates 
Panel A: Size clustering  
  Coefficients 
Market Constant D500 D1000 D5000 . LnSize Adj R2 
A. Downstairs 
2.709*** 3.322*** 1.017*** 1.929*** . -0.968*** 
0.70 
(1529.5) (1499.4) (382.1) (922.7) . (-4239.5) 
B. Upstairs 
2.793*** 3.732*** 0.962*** 1.748*** . -0.964*** 
0.68 
(805.5) (951.5) (205.4) (418.2) . (-1927.5) 
Panel B: Price clustering (off-book trades only) 
  Constant D0 D50 D25 D75 LnPrice Adj R2 
B. Upstairs 
-1.714*** 2.573*** 2.347*** 1.681*** 1.668*** 0.213*** 
0.45 
(-170.7) (898.2) (745.8) (382.5) (375.6) (131.2) 
LnSizePeri is the percentage of orders traded at size i, separately for the upstairs and downstairs markets. D500, D1000 and D5000 are dummy variables that 
equal 1 if the trade size i is a multiple of 500, 1000 and 5000 shares respectively. LnSizei is the natural logarithm of trade size i. LnPricePeri is the 
percentage of orders traded at a decimal price i on the upstairs market. D0, D0.25, D0.50 and D0.75 are dummy variables that equal 1 if the decimal in the 
traded price i is 0, 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75 respectively. LnPricei is the natural logarithm of price i. *,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
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Table 3: Size clustering variation (z- and t-tests) 
 Order type Buy Sell 
                Market      
Asset   
Downstairs Upstairs Downstairs Upstairs 
1 15.96*** 22.33**  16.34***  24.02***  
2 11.67*** 14.79**  12.90***  16.27**  
3 15.29*** 32.29**  15.85***  34.05***  
4 13.41*** 10.14**  12.89***  11.96**  
5 10.36*** 17.00***  10.16***  18.48**  
6 12.46*** 20.58**  12.94**  22.58***  
7 11.08*** 23.44*  11.21***  23.48**  
8 15.41** 29.79***  15.84***  30.77***  
9 13.69*** 28.62***  14.66***  30.77***  
10 15.06*** 18.61***  15.63**  23.13**  
11 15.19*** 21.46***  15.57***  21.73***  
12 12.07** 35.24***  12.99**  38.53***  
13 12.76*** 21.25**  12.10**  22.42***  
14 13.62*** 14.20**  13.95***  18.47**  
15 12.10*** 19.62***  12.42***  21.20***  
16 15.62** 41.93***  15.48**  44.43***  
17 13.50*** 21.44***  13.59***  24.06**  
18 12.44*** 21.89***  13.25***  24.47***  
19 23.80*** 27.87***  24.81***  32.98***  
20 10.79*** 11.20**  10.31***  13.46***  
21 19.02*** 22.01***  19.48**  23.71***  
22 21.65** 46.36***  19.72*  49.74***  
23 14.07*** 22.70***  14.19***  26.30***  
24 12.83*** 13.25**  12.81***  15.50**  
25 13.68**  17.41***  14.12**  19.40***  
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26 11.87**  9.67**  12.85***  12.05***  
27 12.08**  9.14**  11.92***  11.14***  
28 17.23***  15.50***  17.69**  20.73***  
29 14.40***  13.52***  14.26***  15.27**  
30 15.83***  19.16***  15.69***  22.07***  
31 13.90***  26.65***  13.86***  28.41***  
32 13.07***  21.30**  12.57**  23.67***  
33 14.03***  34.29***  14.31***  38.38***  
34 15.89**  34.58***  16.59**  38.28***  
35 13.84***  19.90***  13.77**  24.18***  
36 13.81***  13.92**  14.13**  18.44***  
Total 
(t-test) 
14.26  22.03  14.47  24.57  
(-5.00)*** (-6.36)*** 
Each cell reports the percent of total trading frequency trading in multiples of 500 shares. Individual asset significance tests 
are conducted using the z-test. In the last two rows, the t-test is used to test for differences in means between the order-book 
and off-book trades. *,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Effective half-spread estimates 
 Market Downstairs Upstairs 
 Order type Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Asset Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst 
1 0.027 0.028** 0.026 0.026 -0.040 -0.032 -0.022 -0.061*** 
2 0.036 0.034*** 0.034 0.030*** -0.027 -0.050*** -0.007 -0.041*** 
3 0.039 0.038* 0.035 0.035 -0.079 -0.104 -0.009 -0.038*** 
4 0.034 0.033*** 0.031 0.028*** -0.039 -0.042 0.009 -0.043*** 
5 0.027 0.028*** 0.026 0.026 -0.019 -0.043*** -0.011 -0.055*** 
6 0.037 0.035*** 0.033 0.032*** -0.013 -0.068*** -0.035 -0.088*** 
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7 0.030 0.032*** 0.027 0.030*** -0.026 -0.085*** -0.036 -0.052** 
8 0.030 0.031*** 0.029 0.029 -0.031 -0.047 -0.046 -0.079*** 
9 0.036 0.034*** 0.035 0.033 -0.059 -0.056 -0.027 -0.078*** 
10 0.050 0.049*** 0.044 0.042*** -0.084 -0.076 0.004 -0.056*** 
11 0.023 0.021*** 0.021 0.019*** -0.031 -0.053*** -0.009 -0.028*** 
12 0.094 0.088*** 0.091 0.088*** -0.068 -0.062 -0.037 -0.061*** 
13 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.029*** -0.046 -0.047 -0.004 -0.014** 
14 0.056 0.055 0.049 0.050 -0.061 -0.061 -0.039 -0.071 
15 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.028*** -0.037 -0.052** -0.027 -0.031 
16 0.118 0.110*** 0.111 0.109** -0.062 -0.051 -0.076 -0.106*** 
17 0.028 0.031*** 0.028 0.028 -0.031 -0.067*** -0.035 -0.039 
18 0.032 0.030*** 0.030 0.028*** -0.034 -0.046** -0.020 -0.058*** 
19 0.078 0.076*** 0.074 0.072*** -0.062 -0.070*** -0.022 -0.059*** 
20 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.029 -0.035 -0.040 -0.007 -0.035*** 
21 0.033 0.032*** 0.030 0.030*** -0.022 -0.048*** -0.023 -0.053*** 
22 0.212 0.210 0.219 0.214*** -0.148 -0.109*** -0.212 -0.158 
23 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 -0.027 -0.030 -0.015 -0.051*** 
24 0.031 0.030** 0.028 0.025*** -0.009 0.028*** -0.032 -0.070*** 
25 0.035 0.033*** 0.033 0.031*** -0.021 -0.031*** -0.010 -0.043*** 
26 0.059 0.056 0.081 0.125*** 0.009 -0.046 -0.086 -0.178* 
27 0.027 0.027 0.021 0.023*** -0.034 -0.037 -0.004 -0.034*** 
28 0.050 0.049*** 0.047 0.042*** -0.039 -0.038 -0.007 -0.045*** 
29 0.035 0.034 0.030 0.031*** -0.017 -0.020 -0.032 -0.113*** 
30 0.036 0.035*** 0.034 0.034** -0.029 -0.037*** -0.016 -0.064*** 
31 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.032 -0.083 -0.068 0.014 -0.023*** 
32 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.034 -0.016 -0.099*** -0.056 -0.086* 
33 0.041 0.043*** 0.040 0.039 -0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.088*** 
34 0.083 0.068*** 0.083 0.077*** -0.074 -0.037*** -0.040 -0.126*** 
35 0.036 0.041 0.036 0.037 -0.043 -0.034 -0.027 -0.095*** 
36 0.047 0.045*** 0.044 0.038*** -0.040 -0.036 -0.014 -0.068*** 
Total 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.045 -0.042 -0.051 -0.029 -0.066*** 
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Effective half-spread is calculated as:  . Di,t equals one for buy trades and negative one for sell orders. Pi,t is the 
trade price and Mi,t is the midpoint that prevailed at the time of the trade. SzClst (Sz) refers to average effective spreads for trades of sizes (not) of 
multiples of 500 shares. The t-test is used to test for differences in means between clustered and non-clustered trades separately for order-book 
and off-book trades. *,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Price impact estimates 
 Market Downstairs Upstairs 
 Order type Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Asset Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst 
1 0.026 0.021*** 0.015 0.018*** -0.010 0.034*** 0.011 0.029*** 
2 0.028 0.036*** 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.018 0.008 0.027*** 
3 0.037 0.046*** 0.020 0.029*** -0.014 -0.011 0.031 0.070*** 
4 0.030 0.030 0.019 0.022** 0.000 0.033*** 0.016 0.021 
5 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.017 0.013 0.030*** 0.003 0.026*** 
6 0.026 0.021*** 0.023 0.033*** 0.029 0.067*** -0.010 -0.001 
7 0.026 0.034*** 0.021 0.029*** 0.010 0.027** 0.003 0.032*** 
8 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.031*** 0.010 0.084*** -0.009 -0.021 
9 0.032 0.041*** 0.022 0.023 -0.013 0.040 0.034 0.027*** 
10 0.040 0.052*** 0.029 0.049*** -0.013 0.004** 0.007 0.038*** 
11 0.015 0.016** 0.009 0.010 -0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.020*** 
12 0.056 0.061*** 0.044 0.061*** -0.002 0.010** 0.008 0.006 
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13 0.026 0.028* 0.018 0.024*** -0.008 0.008*** 0.005 0.024*** 
14 0.042 0.039 0.043 0.064*** 0.019 0.061 -0.026 0.031* 
15 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.018 -0.007 0.000 0.009 0.024*** 
16 0.061 0.082*** 0.053 0.072*** 0.012 0.026* -0.013 -0.004 
17 0.029 0.042*** 0.022 0.025 0.009 0.022* 0.002 0.023*** 
18 0.025 0.033*** 0.021 0.023 -0.001 0.028*** 0.004 0.023*** 
19 0.044 0.061*** 0.030 0.045*** -0.007 -0.006 0.008 0.015*** 
20 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.003 0.056*** 0.010 0.013 
21 0.022 0.022*** 0.021 0.024 0.008 0.022*** -0.007 -0.002* 
22 0.115 0.139*** 0.094 0.143*** -0.011 0.044** -0.032 -0.028 
23 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.001 0.013*** 0.002 -0.001 
24 0.030 0.019*** 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.112*** -0.016 -0.004 
25 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.027*** 0.007 0.013*** 0.000 0.002 
26 0.043 0.047 0.040 0.053*** 0.066 0.065 -0.093 -0.105 
27 0.020 0.014*** 0.016 0.024*** 0.006 0.013*** 0.004 0.014*** 
28 0.036 0.036*** 0.024 0.029 0.000 0.008*** 0.007 0.008 
29 0.023 0.006*** 0.033 0.049*** 0.038 0.092*** -0.025 -0.038** 
30 0.026 0.023*** 0.017 0.021*** 0.003 0.012*** 0.000 0.003 
31 0.032 0.030 0.022 0.035*** -0.028 0.016*** 0.041 0.074*** 
32 0.022 0.015*** 0.031 0.037*** 0.051 0.092*** -0.026 -0.017 
33 0.031 0.029 0.025 0.040*** 0.012 0.050*** 0.019 0.016 
34 0.056 0.076*** 0.045 0.058*** -0.017 0.045*** 0.014 -0.010* 
35 0.026 0.035*** 0.018 0.020 0.008 0.032*** 0.000 -0.016** 
36 0.036 0.045*** 0.032 0.039*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 0.018*** 
Total 0.033 0.037 0.027 0.036* 0.006 0.033*** 0.000 0.009 
Price impact is calculated as: . Di,t equals one for buy trades and negative one for sell orders. Mi,t is 
the midpoint at time t. SzClst (Sz) refers to the average price impact estimates for trades of sizes (not) of multiples of 500 shares. The t-
test is used to test for differences in means between clustered and non-clustered trades separately for order-book and off-book trades. 
*,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 6: Realised spread estimates 
 Market Downstairs Upstairs 
 Order type Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Asset Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst 
1 0.001 0.006*** 0.011 0.007*** -0.032 -0.064*** -0.032 -0.090*** 
2 0.008 -0.002*** 0.014 0.009*** -0.034 -0.067*** -0.015 -0.067*** 
3 0.002 -0.008*** 0.015 0.007*** -0.053 -0.095*** -0.039 -0.100*** 
4 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.006*** -0.038 -0.072*** -0.007 -0.063*** 
5 0.006 0.008* 0.010 0.008 -0.032 -0.073*** -0.013 -0.077*** 
6 0.011 0.014** 0.010 -0.001*** -0.041 -0.129*** -0.025 -0.092*** 
7 0.004 -0.001*** 0.007 0.001*** -0.036 -0.117*** -0.036 -0.077*** 
8 0.008 0.009 0.007 -0.002*** -0.040 -0.130*** -0.037 -0.058*** 
9 0.004 -0.007*** 0.012 0.011 -0.046 -0.092*** -0.062 -0.106*** 
10 0.010 -0.003*** 0.015 -0.006*** -0.072 -0.084** -0.003 -0.085*** 
11 0.008 0.006*** 0.011 0.010** -0.023 -0.048*** -0.013 -0.048*** 
12 0.039 0.027*** 0.047 0.028*** -0.066 -0.073 -0.046 -0.067*** 
13 0.007 0.005* 0.012 0.004*** -0.039 -0.055*** -0.009 -0.037*** 
14 0.015 0.018 0.007 -0.014*** -0.079 -0.118*** -0.014 -0.102*** 
15 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.010* -0.031 -0.052*** -0.036 -0.056*** 
16 0.058 0.030*** 0.058 0.038*** -0.072 -0.079 -0.060 -0.099*** 
17 0.000 -0.011*** 0.006 0.004 -0.040 -0.088*** -0.038 -0.058** 
18 0.007 -0.002*** 0.008 0.005*** -0.034 -0.077*** -0.021 -0.076*** 
19 0.034 0.015*** 0.044 0.027*** -0.055 -0.063*** -0.029 -0.073*** 
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20 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.039 -0.094*** -0.015 -0.049*** 
21 0.011 0.010** 0.009 0.006*** -0.030 -0.068*** -0.016 -0.050*** 
22 0.098 0.071*** 0.126 0.072*** -0.144 -0.150 -0.200 -0.126 
23 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.028 -0.043*** -0.018 -0.051*** 
24 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 -0.003*** -0.037 -0.080*** -0.017 -0.070*** 
25 0.011 0.009*** 0.009 0.004*** -0.029 -0.044*** -0.010 -0.044*** 
26 0.016 0.010 0.044 0.077* -0.059 -0.105*** 0.004 -0.082*** 
27 0.006 0.013*** 0.005 -0.002*** -0.040 -0.047*** -0.007 -0.046*** 
28 0.015 0.013 0.023 0.014*** -0.038 -0.043* -0.014 -0.053*** 
29 0.011 0.028*** -0.003 -0.017*** -0.055 -0.115*** -0.005 -0.060*** 
30 0.010 0.012*** 0.017 0.013*** -0.032 -0.048*** -0.016 -0.065*** 
31 0.004 0.006 0.011 -0.003*** -0.056 -0.085*** -0.024 -0.087*** 
32 0.013 0.021*** 0.004 -0.003*** -0.067 -0.184*** -0.028 -0.067*** 
33 0.010 0.013 0.015 -0.001*** -0.048 -0.086*** -0.054 -0.102*** 
34 0.027 -0.008*** 0.039 0.019*** -0.059 -0.081*** -0.052 -0.114*** 
35 0.010 0.006 0.018 0.017 -0.050 -0.064*** -0.027 -0.078*** 
36 0.011 0.000*** 0.013 -0.001*** -0.043 -0.071*** -0.016 -0.082*** 
Total 0.014 0.009 0.018 0.010* -0.048 -0.083*** -0.029 -0.074*** 
The realised spread is calculated as the difference between the effective half-spread and the price impact. SzClst (Sz) refers to the 
average realised spread estimates for trades of sizes (not) of multiples of 500 shares. The t-test is used to test for differences in means 
between clustered and non-clustered trades separately for order-book and off-book trades. *,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
39 
 
Table 7: The effect of trade size on spread measures 
 Market Downstairs Upstairs 
 Order type Buy Sell Buy Sell 
Asset Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst Sz SzClst 
Panel A: 1 – 1500 Shares 
EHS 0.047 0.045 0.045 0.041 -0.037 -0.032 -0.014 -0.033** 
PI 0.030 0.027 0.021 0.017 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
RHS 0.017 0.019 0.025 0.024 -0.041 -0.036 -0.013 -0.028*** 
Panel B: 1501 – 3000 Shares 
EHS 0.047 0.044 0.046 0.042 -0.036 -0.016** -0.027 -0.043*** 
PI 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.025 0.003 0.020* -0.002 -0.007 
RHS 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.017 -0.040 -0.036 -0.024 -0.036*** 
Panel C: 3001 + Shares 
EHS 0.047 0.047 0.046 0.047 -0.077 -0.071 -0.075 -0.09 
PI 0.037 0.040* 0.033 0.041 0.018 0.051*** 0.015 0.021 
RHS 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.006 -0.091 -0.121*** -0.090 -0.109** 
SzClst (Sz) refers to average effective spreads for trades of sizes (not) of multiples of 500 shares. Effective half-spread is calculated as:  . Di,t 
equals one for buy trades and negative one for sell orders. Pi,t is the trade price and Mi,t is the midpoint that prevailed at the time of the trade. Price impact is calculated as: 
. The realised spread (RHS) is calculated as the difference between the effective half-spread and the price impact. The t-test is used to test for 
differences in means between clustered and non-clustered trades separately for order-book and off-book trades. *,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Endogeneity test 
Market Downstairs Upstairs 
Dependent Size Clust Price Clust Size Clust Price Clust 
PrcClst 0.13***   0.09***   
(29.07)   (4.64)   
PrcRs -0.10***   0.07***   
(-16.06)   (3.39)   
SzClst   -1.66***   -2.25*** 
  (-6.46)   (-4.01) 
SzRs   1.82***   2.51*** 
  (7.09)   (4.49) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.70 0.42 0.24 
N 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 
SzClst is the percentage of trades conducted at multiples of 500 shares and PrClst is the percentage of 
trades conducted at integers (downstairs market) or at multiples of the minimum tick size (upstairs 
market). PrcRs and SzRs denote the residuals from the PrClst and SzClst variables from the first set of 
regressions respectively.  
*,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 9: 2SLS regression estimates 
Market Downstairs Upstairs 
Dependent Size Clust Price Clust Size Clust Price Clust 
Constant -27.99*** -73.37*** -20.03*** 9.61 
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(-32.19) (-3.66) (-15.35) (1.53) 
PrcClst 
0.13***   0.11***   
(28.60)   (6.05)   
SzClst 
  -3.01***   0.10*** 
  (-3.75)   (4.95) 
Frq 
0.001586***   0.000086   
(16.47)   (0.18)   
SQRTFrq 
  -369.65***   -21.10 
  (-2.83)   (-1.40) 
AR 
4.29*** 25.38*** 4.79*** -2.73** 
(9.82) (5.20) (12.36) (-2.16) 
LnTrdSz 
4.75*** 19.88*** 5.79*** -2.24* 
(57.42) (4.46) (65.45) (-1.91) 
LnMV 
-0.87*** -5.56*** -2.00*** 0.45 
(-9.87) (-5.77) (-16.52) (1.57) 
OEQ 
0.28*   0.52*   
(1.84)   (1.85)   
PrcLvl 
  0.08***   0.03*** 
  (12.65)   (17.02) 
Tck 
  8.20***   -4.19*** 
  (7.70)   (-4.25) 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.45 0.40 0.17 
N 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 
SzClst is the percentage of trades conducted at multiples of 500 shares and PrClst is the percentage of 
trades conducted at integers (downstairs market) or at multiples of the minimum tick size (upstairs 
market). Frq is the daily number of trades for each contract, separately for the electronic and the upstairs 
market. Similarly, SQRTFreq is the inverse square root of the daily number of trades. AR is the average 
absolute daily return calculated over hourly intervals. LnTrdSz denotes the natural logarithm of the 
average daily trade size for each contract separately for electronic and market makers trades. OEQ is a 
binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a stock trades at a calendar quarter end. LnMV is the 
natural logarithm of .market capitalisation for each firm. Firm values are obtained from DataStream. 
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PrcLvl denotes the average daily price level for each contract and market segment. Tck is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks trading at a high tick size.  
*,**, *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Downstairs market 
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Panel B: Upstairs market 
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Panel A: Downstairs market (Price clustering: integers, size clustering: multiples of 500 shares) 
 
Fig 1: Trade size distribution  
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Panel B: Upstairs market (Price clustering: minimum tick, size clustering: multiples of 500 shares) 
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Fig 2: Intraday distribution of size and price clustering. 
For the downstairs market, price clustering refers to the percentage of trades that are conducted at 
integers. For the upstairs market, price clustering refers to the percentage of trades conducted at 
the notional minimum tick sizes (i.e. xx.25 and xx.50). 
 
 
